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Drobnicki, John A.  Book review of Russia’s Retreat from Poland, 1920: From Permanent 
Revolution to Peaceful Coexistence, by Thomas C. Fiddick.  New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. 
Russia's Retreat from Poland, 1920 is in some ways a misleading title, for Thomas C. Fiddick’s 
revisionist book is not so much concerned with the Russo-Polish War as it is with examining 
Soviet Russia’s political and military leadership during 1919-1920.  Using a wide range of 
Russian source materials, Fiddick challenges the traditional view that the Bolshevik regime was 
bent on European, if not world, conquest. 
 
Fiddick’s argument is that internal problems, such as the terrible state of the economy and 
Wrangel’s troops in the Crimea, were paramount in Lenin’s mind, and that he had no desire to 
use the Red Army to export revolution in 1919-1920.  Lenin was confident that the oppressed 
workers of Europe, especially the Versailles-burdened Germans, would revolt and overthrow 
their governments on their own.  This view was shared by Trotsky, who even went so far as to 
turn some parts of the Red Army into four “Revolutionary Armies of Labour.”  When Piłsudski 
invaded the Ukraine in April 1920, Soviet Russia had very limited, definite goals, according to 
Fiddick: to defend their territory and force the Poles to make peace as quickly as possible, so the 
Soviet leadership could concentrate on negotiating trade agreements with the West and deal a 
final, crushing blow to Wrangel. 
 
General Tukhachevsky, however, did not share the view of his Party leaders, a schism which 
Fiddick traces to the Soviet reply to Curzon’s famous note.  Tukhachevsky interpreted the Soviet 
rejection as “a green light for the Red Army to march forward” in “an all-out struggle between 
Russia and European capitalism,” according to the author.  Neither Lenin nor Trotsky wanted 
Tukhachevsky to attempt to take Warsaw, for it would jeopardize both trade negotiations with 
England and the upcoming battle against Wrangel’s White Army; but Trotsky did, however, try 
to protect the General’s overextended forces by adding some Southwestern Armies to his 
command, a move designed also to attempt to slow down the impetuous Tukhachevsky.  Fiddick 
documents how Lenin, perhaps purposely, failed to notify Stalin (the commissar of the 
Southwestern front) of this transfer of command and actually led him to believe that these forces 
were still under his control.  Thus, when Glavkom and Tukhachevsky formally requested that 
these troops be moved to the Polish front, Stalin, who opposed the march on Warsaw and who 
believed Wrangel to be the major threat, pointedly refused to send them.  While Fiddick shows 
that both Tukhachevsky and Stalin bear much of the blame for the Polish victory, he believes 
that Lenin does also – “not for recklessly pushing Tukhachevsky toward Warsaw, as has so often 
been maintained, but for undermining attempts by Trotsky and Glavkom to protect him.” 
 
Those who are familiar with Norman Davies’ While Eagle, Red Star (which is cited numerous 
times) will disagree with Fiddick’s chronology of the Russo-Polish War.  Fiddick begins his 
account of the war in April 1920 with Poland’s invasion of the Ukraine, and he repeatedly speaks 
of “Polish aggression.”  According to Davies, however, the war actually began in February 1919, 
when Polish and Russian troops simultaneously moved into territory recently evacuated by the 
German army – thus, the war was the fault of neither side, or of both sides, since there was no 
established border between Poland and Soviet Russia at that time; Piłsudski’s invasion of the 
Ukraine, then, would be the opening campaign of the second year of the war.  Although he does 
not provide exact figures, Fiddick also writes that Poland was receiving aid from England and 
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France during the Russo-Polish War, something which several Polish authors have disputed – 
some even suggest that the Allies provided no aid to Poland until July 1920, after Poland agreed 
to the Allies’ unfavorable settlement of her dispute with Czechoslovakia over Teschen. 
 
These comments do not detract from the overall merits of Russia’s Retreat from Poland, 
however, since the war is used as a back-drop to examine Soviet foreign policy and political and 
military leadership, at which it is very successful.  Professor Fiddick provides valuable insight 
into a complex period of Soviet history, and into the activities of not only Lenin, Stalin, and 
Trotsky, but also Felix Dzerzhinsky, Karl Radek, and Leonid Krasin.  While his interpretations 
may differ from some of the standard works, they must certainly be reckoned with by those 
interested in the history of the early Bolshevik regime. 
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